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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE MORRIS,
Appellant,

-vsTHE FARNSWORTH MOTEL, and
DEWEY F. FARNSWORTH, FRANK
M. FARNSWORTH, and J. L. CAR~
DON d.b.a. THE FARNSWORTH
MOTEL,
Respondents.

Case No.
7947

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal is from an order granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The record on appeal
includes the deposition of plaintiff as well as the com~
plaint and affidavits of defendants. During the nighttime
1
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plaintiff stubbed and broke his toe on a chair in defen..
dants' motel as he proceeded to the bathroom adjoining
the bedroom which he occupied. It is undisputed that
plaintiff did not turn on any of the lights which were
provided in the room. The complaint alleges that one
of the defendants in the course of preparing the room for
occupancy, wilfully, recklessly or negligently placed and
left a chair in the passageway leading to the bathroom
doorway. The defendants' made their motion for summary
judgment in accordance with the provisions of Rule 56 (b)
and (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in sup..
port thereof filed the affidavits of the individual defendants,
the motel owners, and also the plaintiff's deposition. The
motion was based on the grounds that as a matter of law
,defendants were not negligent and that plaintiff's failuFe to
turn on a light in the bedroom constituted contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The issue on appeal is the
correctness of the trial court's decision which granted de..
fendants' motion for summary judgment and ordered that
plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact in
this case. The undisputed facts upon which defendants'
motion for summary judgment was granted, are as fol ..
lows. In May, 1952, plaintiff and his wife drove from
Salt Lake City to El Paso, Texas to visit their son
Larry who was in the Army and to visit the defendants.
Plaintiff is a brother..in..law of the individual defendants.
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Mrs. Morris, plaintiff's wife, is a sister of Dewey and
Frank M. Farnsworth and of Mrs. J. L. Cardon (R. 6, 7).
On May 23, 1952, Mr. and Mrs. Morris drove from
Cortez, Colorado to El Paso, Texas, arriving at their
brothers..-in. .law's motel sometime between 4:00 and 6:00
p.m. (Dep. 9) .
The motel is a single story structure containing 28
rooms forming a three..-sided square (R. 6, Dep. 11).
Over the porch there is a neon light which runs around
most of the motel (R. 7). After registering at the office
plaintiff carried his luggage to his room and bathed.
(Dep. 11). That evening plaintiff and his wife and their
son and possibly some of the defendants had dinner to . .
gether at a downtown restaurant (Dep. 14). After dinner
Larry returned to his army post and Mr. and Mrs. Morris
visited with the defendants in the motel office (Dep. 15).
Plaintiff could not recall whether or not he returned to
his room after dinner and prior to the time he visited
in the motel office (Dep. 16). Mrs. Morris went to bed
about 9:30 p.m. (Dep. 15). Plaintiff continued to discuss
affairs in the motel office until sometime between 10:00
and 11:00 p.m. when he went to his room and prepared
to go to bed (Dep. 16). Plaintiff did not turn on the
overhead light nor the bed lamp on the night stand which
were provided in the room but undressed in the dim light
which came through the venetian shades from the neon
light outside the room (Dep. 16). Mrs. Morris was not
awake. She had taken his pajamas out of the suitcase
and had placed them on the bed for him (Dep. 29).
After undressing plaintiff proceeded towards the bath. .
room where he struck his little toe on the left foot against
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the chair which partially blocked the passageway {Dep.
19). Both the chair and the passageway were in a shadow
which was created _by the diffused light which came
through the venetian shades into the bedroom (paragraph
2, complaint). The bedroom which plaintiff and his wife
occupied was 12 by 14 feet. (R. 9). The furniture in
the room consisted of twin beds, two chairs, a luggage
rack, a vanity and a night stand with a bed lamp on it
(R. 6, 7). The passageway referred to in plaintiff's com. .
plaint was formed by the position of one of the twin
beds in the room.
Mr. Dewey Farnsworth had rearranged the furni . .
ture in the room during plaintiff's absence so as to pro. .
vide more room and had placed the chair in the corner
of the bedroom by the bathroom door (R. 7). The accident
did not awaken Mrs. Morris. She first learned of it the
next morning (Dep. 21).
A day or two after the accident defendant, Dewey
Farnsworth, told the plaintiff not to worry: "I have in.surance and the insurance will take care of this accident"
(Dep. 5). Plaintiff only paid for two of the seven or
more nights occupancy at the motel (Dep. 10). The de.fendants told him "You won't pay any more until we
find out how this thing comes out and the settlement
comes out" (Dep. 11). Most of plaintiff's medical ex. .
penses were also paid by the defendants (Dep. 23).
On August 26, 1952, summons was served on Dewey
Farnsworth while he visited in Utah. He notified the
plaintiff in advance of his intended visit and plaintiff re..
layed the information to his attorney (Dep. 6). Prepara..
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tion of the summons for the proposed visit of Mr.
Farnsworth was left up to plaintiff's counsel (Dep. 6).
Thus jurisdiction was acquired in Utah although the ac~
cident happened in Texas. After the insurance company
asked defendants for the records of plaintiff's registration,
this information was telephoned to plaintiff, by one of
the defendants. This occurred within two weeks prior to
the time that plaintiff's deposition was taken· (Dep. 7).
At this latter time plaintiff stated that the accident oc~
curred on May 23rd instead of the 30th as he alleged
in his complaint (Dep. 9).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT
NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO FORESEE THAT
PLAINTIFF WOULD STUB HIS TOE IN THE MOTEL
BEDROOM WHEN HE FAILED TO TURN ON THE
LIGHT.
Counsel for both parties have searched the digests
for cases dealing with accidents occurring because of the
placement of furniture in a hotel bedroom. None have
been found either imposing or denying liability. This ab~
sence of cases indicates this is the first occasion in which
a plaintiff's attorney has urged that the placement of
furniture in a hotel room be considered a basis for
liability.
The room in question was perfectly safe and suitable
for occupancy. No defects of any kind existed. The chair
was a plain, ordinary chair. The room was provided with
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an overhead light, a bed lamp on the night stand and
also a bathroom light.
Plaintiff contends in his brief that "common sense
dictates that they (defendants) must regard an obstruc-tion (the chair) so placed as to be partially in the
shadows to be a potential source of danger to their pa-trons." The fact is that the chair was not placed so as
to be in any shadow.- The chair was placed in the corner
of the bedroom next to the bathroom door sometime in
the late afternoon on May 23rd (R. 7). No shadows
dark enough to obscure the chair were cast upon it at
that time of day, nor at any time of night if the simple
act of turning on the lights had been performed. If plaintiff
had switched on the ceiling light or the night stand lamp,
the chair would have been plainly evident. The plaintiff
had no right to rely on the outside light which "dimly
lit" the room. This failure to turn on either of the lights
provided was the cause of plaintiff's not seeing the chair
and was the reason orally assigned by the trial court why
plaintiff was not entitled to take his case to a jury.
Plaintiff's brief states:
"It must have been obvious to the defendants
that their patrons would not normally turn on all of
the lights in the motel at a late hour . . ." (Italics
added).
The evidence shows that plaintiff did not turn on any light
whatsoever!
Counsel for plaintiff attempted to excuse the failure
to turn on the light by setting forth the facts in the com. .
plaint that when plaintiff first entered the room he he..
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carne acquainted with the plan of said apartment, that
when he prepared to go to bed the room was illuminated
through its windows but the passageway was in the
shadow and that because of said shadow plaintiff ran into
the chair.
Plaintiff's argument concerning his reasonableness in
proceeding to the bathroom in the dimly lit room and
relying on his memory to guide him is defective in three
ways.
First his testimony in the deposition shows that he
did not inspect the room so as to familiarize himself with
its contents. In this regard plaintiff testified that at the
time he undressed just before the accident occurred he
laid his clothes on a straight. .back chair that was in the
corner by his bed, but he could not recall whether it was
the same chair that had been there at the time he first
"familiarized" himself with the room. Although plaintiff
occupied this room for over a week (Dep. 10) and in
discussing the accident with Mr. Dewey Farnsworth was
told that the insurance would take care of it (Dep. 5)
he could not remember how many lights were in the room
(Dep. 17), whether or not there was a bed lamp on the
night stand by his bed (Dep. 17) nor how many chairs
were in the room when he first entered. ("There was the
one chair only that was in the room that I noticed")
(Dep. 20). He could not remember whether or not the
chair upon which he stubbed his toe was left in the room
for the remaining time of his occupancy, (Dep. 26), nor
could he recall the low wooden luggage rack which was
in the room (Dep. 12). Although Mr. Morris states that
he only noticed the one chair by his bed, he carefully
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qualified his answer to say that there was not a chair in
front of the bathroom door when he first entered the
room. He did not state that there was not a chair in that
corner at the time he inspected the premises. The affida. .
vits of Dewey and F. M. Farnsworth both state that
there were two chairs, a luggage rack and a bed lamp in
the room (R. 6, 7). The alleged conclusion that plaintiff
became acquainted with the plan of said apartment or
that he familiarized himself with the room is entirely con. .
.tradicted by his own testimony in the record.
Second, for a person to resort to a method of guiding
himself in a dimly lit room by memory when the obvious
r~~sonable thi~g to ..do is to switch on the bed lamp is
clearly negligence. Third, his scheme was entirely unfore. .
seeable to the defendants. In regard to the second and
third points the decision in St. Paul Hotel Co. v. Lohm
( 1952) 196 F. 2d 233, is particularly apt. In that case a
hotel guest while in the shower attempted in haste and
without drying himself to seat himself sideways .upon
the seat of a toilet. The wooden seat which was hinged to
the brittle part of the porcelain bowl broke causing the
injuries complained of. In reversing a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
"But it is equally common knowledge that such
seats hinged on the brittle porcelain parts are not
meant to resist the pressure of weights thrust against
them from the side as plaintiff admits he did in this
instance."
The court stated that the following instruction correctly
states the law of Minnesota:
" ... When a hotel furnishes a facility such as a
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toilet facility, to a guest, the law intends that the
guest shall use such facility in a proper and author-ized manner and the hotel cannot be expected to
foresee and therefore the hotel would not be negligent ·
if the guest uses such toilet facility in a manner not
intended."
This fundamental principle directly applies to plaintiff's
reliance on the neon light which came from outside the
motel and dimly lit the room. Plaintiff did not exercise
due care in relying on the light which came from out_.
side the room nor were such lights intended or installed
for that purpose. Defendants had every reason to believe
that plaintiff would turn on one of the lights provided
and thus be able to see objects in the room. Plaintiff
cannot excuse his omission to turn on the light by the
alleged inference that he familiarized himself with the loca_.
tion of all objects and corners in the room and at the
same time place defendants under a legal obligation to
have foreseen such an attempted use of memory. Nor
could defendants reasonably be expected to foresee what
shadows would be present in the room when plaintiff
chose to rely on the outside light instead of the lights
provided. In exercising his duty of reasonable care, an
innkeeper need not anticipate that when a guest goes to
his room at night that his pajamas will be laid out on the
bed for him; that his wife will be asleep; that he will not
turn on the light so as not to awaken her; that a chair
which partially blocks the passageway will be in the
shadow of a neon light running around the eaves of the
motel because the inside light is not turned on and that
the guest relying on his powers of memory will walk in
the darkness and tqere stub his toe.
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POINT II. THIS IS NOT A CASE CONCERN;
lNG HIDDEN DEFECTS NOR HAZARDOUS CON;
DITIONS.
Plaintiff in paragraph la of his argument terms the
placing of the chair in the motel bedroom a hidden defect,
a hazard and a dangerous condition. Plaintiff would have
this court hold that the placement of furniture in a
motel bedroom which "obstructs free movement and ac ..
cess between rooms" is comparable .to permitting the lights
at a Bryce Canyon lodge to go out three or four times a
day and just as plaintiff attempted to go downstairs,
Carpenter v. Syrett 99 Utah 208, 104 P. 2d 617; to the
collapse of the frame of a folding wall bed which fell on
plaintiff as she was lying therein, Shattuck v. St. Francis
Hotel, 7 Cal. 2d 358, 60 P. 2d 855; to the splintering
of a porcelain faucet when plaintiff attempted to turn off
the hot water, Adams. v. Dow Hotel Co., 25 Cal. App.
2d 51, 76 P. 2d 21 0; to the risk involved in placing three
wooden blocks underneath one corner of a bathtub to
support it, Tapley v. Zeeman, 216 Cal. 182, 13 P. 2d 666
or to the maintenance of an air shaft which was next
to the staircase and was protected by a hand railing with
a spring catch insufficient to prevent the gate from swing..
ing open upon pressure applied by decedent, Robertson
v. Weingart, 91 Cal. App. 715, 267 P. 741.
The distinction between these cases and the instant
one is plain. Here the position of the chair did not con ..
stitute a defect or hazard of either an obvious or obscure
nature, the presence of which a reasonable, prudent motel
owner should search out and warn a guest. In Lindquist
v. S. S. Kresge & Co., 345 Mo. 849, 136 S.W. 2d 303,
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the plaintiff slipped on worn marble stairs in the defen. .
dant's store. A judgment of nonsuit was affirmed. The
court stated:
"Nor is there any presumption of negligence on
the part of an owner or occupier merely upon a
showing that an injury has been sustained by one
while rightfully on the premises. The true ground of
liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge of the
perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom
to persons going upon the property. It is when the
perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or
occupant and not to the person injured that a re. .
covery is permitted.''
It should be remembered that the accident here com. .
plained of, happened in Texas and the case is not con. .
trolled by Utah decisions. Plaintiff's right to recover dam. .
ages in this case is to be determined according to the law
of Texas.
''The law of the place of wrong determines
whether a person has sustained a legal (compensable)
injury." Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,
Section 3 78 et seq.
Counsel for respondent have been unable to find any
Texas cases which concern the placement of furniture
in a hotel room. In Texas Hotel Co. of Longview v. Cosby,
Tex. Civ. App. 131 S.W. 2d 261, the court stated the
general rules of an innkeeper's duty in regard to the
safety of its guests as follows:
"Relative to the duty of the Texas Hotel Com. .
pany, the innkeeper to the safety of its guest, in 32
Cor. Jr. Sec. 68, page 561, it is stated:
'' 'While an innkeeper is not an insurer of the
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safety of his guests, 1t 1s his duty to take at least
reasonable care of the persons of his guests so that
they may not be injured while in the inn by want
of such care on his part.'
"Or as stated in Baugh v. McClesky, Tex. Civ. App.
292 s.w. 950, 952:
" '. . . In order to charge the innkeeper with
liability for injury to the person . . . negligence on
the part of the innkeeper must be shown in connec..
tion with the very circumstances which produced the
injury.' "
In Kopelson v. New York Hotel Statler Company,
131 Misc. 525, 227 N.Y.S. 281, plaintiff cut her foot on
a cuspidor which was under the table around which she
and other guests of defendant's hotel were sitting. A
judgment for plaintiff was reversed and the complaint
dismissed on the merits. The court said: "We do not
understand how it can be validly claimed that the placing
of one or more cuspidors in one of the public rooms of
a hotel is negligence."
POINT III. PLAINTIFF
TORIL.,{ NEGLIGENT.

WAS

CONTRIBU..

Pla.ntiff cites no authority for his contention that he
was ent ttled to rely on the position of the chair being
unchant~ed. This proposition is legally unsound. This is
not a si1uation of a person becoming familiar over a long
period of time with objects of furniture in his own home.
Plaintifl after driving from Cortez, Colorado to El Paso
checked in at the motel about 4:00 p.m., took a bath,
went out to dinner and then returned late in the even.-
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ing for the first night's occupancy of the motel bedroom.
To reat·range the beds, chairs or luggage rack during
plaintiff's absence was not an unusual nor a negligent
thing to do. The cleaning staffs of hotels and office build~
ings oft--times move objects of furniture in cleaning the
room. To say that a guest may rely on pieces of furniture
being unchanged ignores common every~day experience to
the contrary. A person occuping a motel bedroom should
· anticipate that his wife or children, or his own guests
who are invited into the room may and often do move
chairs from one position to another. Plaintiff's argument
in this vein would have the court submit the case to a
jury if he had attempted to sit where a chair previously
·had been, relying on its presence by memory rather than
by sight. He states that he wasn't gropnig about blindly;
that there was adequate light to see to· go to bed but the
chair was in a shadow. The fact that the chair was in the
. shadow of an outside light is not the fault of defendants.
This shadow would have disappeared had plaintiff turn~
ed on a light. It is a permissible inference to argue that
the original chair which was in the corner by the bath~
room door at the time of plaintiff's first visit and alleged
familiarization therewith would likewise have been in the
shadow when nighttime occurred. It is this fact which
prompted plaintiff to plead that not only was the chair,
upon which he stubbed his toe in a different position, but
it was also in the shadow. His contention is that he was
relying partly upon memory and partly upon what the
dim light revealed, which in the shadow was nothing;
ergo he could have relied entirely on memory and in the
absence of defendants' change of position of the chair
walked partly into the shadow and still missed the chair.
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On the other hand he could have avoided the shadow
and still missed the chair. But these tenuous suppositions
would all be dispelled if plaintiff had increased his visual
capacity by a flick of the light switch.
Mrs. Morris had already gone to bed and presumably
used the bathroom. If the position of the chair consti.tuted a foreseeable hazard, she would undoubtedly have
moved it. Yet the objects of furniture in a room never
seem in the way when viewed in sufficient light to apprise
a person of their presence. Thus, Mrs. Morris probably
paid no attention to it-simply walked by and into the
bathroom. How different are objects of furniture in a
dark room whose location cannot be definitely fixed! The
hazard itself is created by not turning on the light, not
giving the eyes a chance to see. The comparison of a per..
son of normal vision and a blind man in encountering
downtown traffic and crowds is an illustration of what
hazards are in store for people of different visual capa..
bilities. This situation of danger was not created by de..
fendants. It was caused by plaintiff's negligent decision not
to turn on the lights. The entire problem boils down to
the principle that one man cannot take pains to prevent
injury to another who does not exercise a reasonable
degree of care on his own behalf. If a person will walk in
the semidarkness where shadows obscure his vision, no
one else can prevent him from stubbing his toe.
The assigned reason for his conduct, that he did not
want to awaken his wife, does not legally excuse his
omission. The stage of action on which this accident took
place did not assume a negligent character until plaintiff
proceeded without turning on the light.
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Baker v. Decker et al (Utah 1949) 212 P. 2d 679
cited by appellant is distinguishable in several material
aspects. In that case the accident happened in a hallway
provided for the common use of many tenants living on
the third floor of the Roosevelt apartments. The suit was
dismissed agains·t the owner of the apartments. A jury
verdict against the paperhanger who spread the canvas on
the floor over which plaintiff tripped was affirmed by this
court. The omission to turn on a light in a private room
was not involved. In the Baker case the court held it
was a jury question to determine whether the placement
of the rumpled canvas on the floor or the plaintiff's mis . .
judgment in stepping over it was the cause qf the ac. .
cident. Mr. Morris' failure to turn on the light is a much
more flagrant act of negligence than was Mrs. Baker's error
in stepping over the canvas. Plaintiff's contentions that he
is not bound to turn on the light to apprise himself of
"danger" can be determined as a matter of law. The posi. .
tion of the chair is ''dangerous'' only when. it cannot be
seen because of the dark. There was ample room to walk
past the chair and into the bathroom, if the plaintiff had
availed himself of sufficient light to be able to see. Mrs.
Morris' experience is proof of this. Premonition of danger
over the position of a chair in one of twenty. . eight motel
rooms is much less than setting up a paperhanger's table
in a narrow hallway with tool box, paste bucket and drop
cloth.
In Fort Dodge Hotel Co. v. Bartelt, 119 F · 2d 253
cited and relied upon by appellant, a woman 54 years of
age, wearing bi . . focal glasses and weighing over 200 pounds,
together with her husband, followed a bellboy who was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

carrying their luggage to select one of defendant's hotel
rooms. The bellboy placed the luggage in a dimly lit hall..
way and opened Room 214 for plaintiff and her husband
to inspect. They stated they wanted to see another room
and followed the bellboy into the hall. The bellboy did
not pick up the luggage but proceeded down the hall to
unlock Room 208. Plaintiff was the last person to leave
Room 214. She turned out the lights in the room as she
left. As she emerged from Room 214 into the dimly lit
hallway she fell over her luggage which had been left in
the hallway by the bellboy. The court sustained recovery
of damages and held that the duty of exercising reasonable
care to keep the premises safe included keeping the halls
and passageways free from hazards. This rule would ap..
pear to especially apply where the plaintiff was following
the bellboy through the halls and at all times previously
he had been carrying her luggage. The Bartelt case cites
and distinguishes Walker v. Roosevelt Hotel Company,
214 Iowa 1150, 241 N.W. 484 in which plaintiff was held
to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law when he
fell over a laundry cart in a passageway. The cases were
distinguished on the adequacy of light.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
The glaring omission of plaintiff to turn on the bed lamp
cannot be termed a "close question of fact" which must
be weighed by a jury. Reasonable minds cannot differ on
whose fault it is when a person stubs his toe on a chair
in the passageway in a motel bedroom while moving
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about in the dark, being unable to see because he hasn't
turned on the light!
The chair upon which plaintiff stubbed his toe was not
a hazard nor a dangerous condition until plaintiff proceeded
toward it in the darkness. He attributes his inability to see
the chair to the shadow which was caused by the out. .
side neon light, but the presence of the shadow was due
to plaintiff's own negligent omission. It was impossible for
defendants to foresee that Mr. Morris would not turn on
either the overhead light or the bed lamp on the night
stand which were provided for his use. Defendants were
not negligent in failing to foresee the chain of events which
led to plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff's testimony that his wife
had laid out his pajamas on the bed for him, that he had
previously familiarized himself with the room, but the
chair was in the shadow is such a combination of circum. .
stances and unusual thought processes that no reason. .
able motel owner could be expected to foresee that a
·guest would skip the simple act of turning on the light
and resort to this method of walking in the dark.
Even though the court shpuld find that defendants
were negligent, the conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff
himself was guilty of contributory negligence. The cause
of the accident was the failure to turn on the light. About
that there can be no doubt. This is the normal thing that
would have been done by any other prudent guest and
the omission to perform this simple task was the direct
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The stage of action
on which this accident took place did not assume a
negligent character until plaintiff proceeded without turn. .
ing on the light.
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l'he. order of the trial court is correct and should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PAUL B. CANNON,
. RICHARD H. NEBEKER,
Attorneys /or Respondents.

Of Counsel
Marr, Wilkins & Cannon
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